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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a cooperative approach
to improve the security of both primary and secondary systems
in cognitive radio multicast communications. During their access
to the frequency spectrum licensed to the primary users, the
secondary unlicensed users assist the primary system in fortifying
security by sending a jamming noise to the eavesdroppers,
while simultaneously protect themselves from eavesdropping.
The main objective of this work is to maximize the secrecy
rate of the secondary system, while adhering to all individual
primary users’ secrecy rate constraints. In the case of active
eavesdroppers and perfect channel state information (CSI) at the
transceivers, the utility function of interest is nonconcave and
the involved constraints are nonconvex, and thus, the optimal
solutions are troublesome. To solve this problem, we propose
an iterative algorithm to arrive at least to a local optimum of
the original nonconvex problem. This algorithm is guaranteed
to achieve a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker solution. Then, we extend
the optimization approach to the case of passive eavesdroppers
and imperfect CSI knowledge at the transceivers, where the
constraints are transformed into a linear matrix inequality and
convex constraints, in order to facilitate the optimal solution.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, convex optimization, interfer-
ence, jamming noise, secrecy capacity, multicast transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, a secrecy mechanism is applied at the higher
layers of a communication system by using a secret key
exchange between the source and the destination, such as
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [2]. However, the execution
of key exchange algorithms over wireless networks may be
vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, due to the broadcasting
nature of the wireless transmission media. As a result, research
in information theory for wireless communication systems
has focused on achieving secrecy, by using channel coding
and signal processing techniques at the physical layer (PHY)
[3], [4]. Specifically, the pioneering work [3] introduced PHY
security via wiretap channels, by providing perfect secrecy that
V.-D. Nguyen and O.-S. Shin are with the School of Electronic Engineering
and the Department of ICMC Convergence Technology, Soongsil University,
Seoul 06978, Korea (e-mail: {nguyenvandinh, osshin}@ssu.ac.kr).
T. Q. Duong is with the School of Electronics, Electrical Engineering and
Computer Science, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast BT7 1NN, United
Kingdom (e-mail: trung.q.duong@qub.ac.uk).
A. Nallanathan is with the Centre for Telecommunications Re-
search, King’s College London, London WC2R 2LS, U.K. (e-mail: aru-
mugam.nallanathan@kcl.ac.uk).
G. K. Karagiannidis is with the Department of Electrical and Computer En-
gineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki 54 124, Greece
(e-mail: geokarag@auth.gr).
Part of this work was presented at the 2017 IEEE International Conference
on Communications (ICC) [1].
can be attained when the eavesdropper channel is a degraded
version of the main source-to-destination channel.
Recently, PHY security for wireless communications has
become an important research area. The underlying idea is
to guarantee a positive secrecy rate of legitimate users by
exploiting the random characteristics of wireless channel.
In particular, the authors in [5] proposed a low-complexity
on/off power allocation strategy to attain secrecy under the
assumption of full channel state information (CSI). The use
of cooperative jamming noise (JN) was proposed in [6], where
users who are prevented from transmitting according to a
certain policy block the eavesdropper and thereby assist the
remaining users. In [7], the authors analyzed the optimal loca-
tion of an eavesdropper which results in zero secrecy capacity
of all links, where the location is defined logically in terms of
channel gains. From a quality-of-service (QoS) perspective,
a secret transmit beamforming approach was considered in
[8]–[10], in order to predetermine the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise-ratio (SINR) target at the destination and/or at
the eavesdropper. More recently, a jamming noise technique
(a.k.a. artificial noise) was introduced, in order to improve the
secrecy capacity by confusing the decoding capability of the
eavesdroppers [11]–[17]. Furthermore, in [18], a new secure
transmission was proposed in order to sustain the secrecy of
the communication, by utilizing the available power to produce
artificial noise for the eavesdropper. The authors in [19] con-
sidered the case of a passive eavesdropper with multi-antenna
transmission, where the transmitter simultaneously transmits
an information-bearing signal to the intended receiver and
artificial noise to the eavesdropper. A joint information and
jamming beamforming technique for a full-duplex base station
(BS) which secures both uplink and downlink transmission,
was proposed in [20]. Finally, cooperation between the source
and destination was proposed in [21], with the destination
operating in the full-duplex mode, i.e., the destination receives
information from the source and sends a jamming signal to the
eavesdropper at the same time.
Being a critical issue, PHY security of cognitive radio
networks (CRNs), which deal with specific security risks due
to the broadcasting nature of radio signals, has not been well
investigated until recently, e.g., in [22]–[29]. More specifically,
in [22]–[24], multi-antennas at the secondary transmitter were
utilized to attain beamforming that maximizes the secrecy
capacity of the secondary system, while adhering to the peak
interference constraint at the primary receiver. In [25], coop-
eration between the secondary system and the primary system
was proposed, in order to improve the secrecy capacity of the
2primary system. Furthermore, a simple case with single an-
tenna at the eavesdropper was considered in [26], [27]. Particu-
larly, in [26], joint beamforming for information and jamming
noise was proposed to protect both primary and secondary
systems, with the secondary user acting as an amplify-and-
forward relay to enhance the security of the primary system. A
jamming beamforming technique was designed in [27], based
on the nullspace of the legitimate channel, in order to protect
the primary system by treating the signal from the secondary
transmitter as interference. In [28], the authors considered a
CRN model, where both primary user (PU) and secondary user
(SU) send their confidential messages to intended receivers
that are surrounded by a single eavesdropper. Besides, the
capacity-equivocation region of cognitive interference channel
was obtained in [30], where the primary receiver is treated as
untrusted user (eavesdropper) who intends to eavesdrop the
confidential message of the secondary system. Extensions of
[30] were made in [31], [32] by additionally considering the
secrecy of the primary system.
In this paper, we consider the PHY security in cooper-
ative cognitive radio multicast communications, where the
eavesdroppers intend to wiretap data from both primary and
secondary systems. We assume that the primary transmitter
is equipped only with a single antenna, which implies that
the primary transmitter cannot generate a jamming signal
or design a beamforming vector to protect itself from the
eavesdroppers. The secrecy capacity of the primary system is
improved by implementing a cooperative framework between
the primary and secondary systems. Specifically, the primary
system allows the secondary system to share its spectrum, and
in return the secondary system sends jamming noise to degrade
the eavesdropper’s channel, in order to protect the primary
system. In the CRN multicast transmission model, we assume
that there are one group of PUs and G groups of SUs, where
all users in each group receives identical information from its
transmitter, and furthermore, each group can be surrounded by
multiple eavesdroppers. We note that the recent work in [28]
is a special case of this paper, where only a single receiver
and a single eavesdropper are assumed, which is well-known
as unicast mode.
The aim of this paper is to design the optimal beamforming
vectors that realize the PHY security and maximize the secrecy
rate of the secondary system, while ensuring adherence to
the individual secrecy rate constraints at each primary user.
Specifically, the main contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows:
• For the perfect CSI case, we design a joint informa-
tion and jamming signal at the secondary transmitter,
where information is intended for secondary receivers
and jamming noise is intended for eavesdroppers. The
main objective is to maximize the secrecy rate of the
secondary system, while satisfying the minimum secrecy
rate requirement for each legitimate user of the primary
system as well as the power constraint. We show that
the equivalent problem can be converted to a single-layer
optimization problem, which can be easily solved through
convex quadratic programming.
• When the CSI of the channel from the secondary trans-
mitter to the PUs is imperfect and only partial CSI of the
eavesdroppers is available, we transform the non-linear
constraints into a linear matrix inequality and convex
constraints, based on a specific matrix inequality lemma.
We show that the approximate optimization problem can
be efficiently solved in a similar manner as the perfect
CSI case.
• We propose an efficient method to find the approximate
solution for optimal transmit beamforming, by providing
the convexity of the original problem that is considered
through the use of a convex approximation. The optimal
solutions of transmit beamforming for the confidential
information and jamming noise do not fix the transmit
strategy. Importantly, we develop an iterative algorithm
of low complexity for the computational solution of the
considered optimization problem. The obtained solutions
are proved to be at least local optimum, as satisfying the
necessary optimal conditions.
• We provide extensive numerical results to justify the
novelty of the proposed algorithm and compare its per-
formance with the known solutions. In particular, the
numerical results demonstrate fast convergence of the
proposed algorithm and a significant improvement of the
secrecy rate, compared with other known solutions. We
should remark that our results are more general than in
[28], which was considered under the assumptions of one
eavesdropper and perfect CSI. In addition, the model in
this paper is of practical interest in designing networks
that are required to transmit the same data to a group
of users, for example, in video broadcasting and various
applications. Moreover, the considered problem in this
paper is highly nonlinear and nonconvex function, thus
it is more challenging to solve compared to SINR-based
design in [28].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the CRN multicast transmission model with multiple
eavesdroppers and formulates the optimization problem. Sec-
tion III derives optimal beamforming for information signal
and jamming noise at the secondary transmitter under the
assumption of perfect CSI, while Section IV extends the
considered problem to the case of imperfect CSI and passive
eavesdropper. Section V provides numerical results and dis-
cussions. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section VI. In
order to make the rest of the paper easy to follow, the notations
and symbols used in the paper are specified in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
A. System Model
We consider the PHY security of CRN multicast trans-
mission with cooperation between a primary system and a
secondary system. The primary system consists of one primary
transmitter (PT) and L primary receivers (PRs), while the
secondary system consists of one secondary transmitter (ST)
and M secondary receivers (SRs), as illustrated in Fig. 1. The
ST, which is a BS, is equipped with N antennas, whereas
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Figure 1. A cooperative CRN multicast transmission model with multiple
eavesdroppers.
all other nodes are equipped with only one antenna.1 The
opportunistic spectrum access is improved by assigning the
ST to send G information bearing signals sg, g = 1, · · · , G,
where sg is the information being sent to the g-th group
with unit average power E{|sg|
2} = 1. We assume that
each individual multicast group Gg in the secondary system
consists of Mg secondary receivers. Specifically, the number
of SRs in group Gg is denoted by Sg = {1, · · · ,mg, · · · ,Mg}.
Then, the total number of SRs in the secondary system
with multicast transmission is indeed M =
∑G
g=1Mg. In
the multicast transmission, all users within the same group
will receive identical data from its transmitter. Regarding
security, we assume that the eavesdroppers (Eves) potentially
intend to wiretap and decode confidential messages from
both primary and secondary systems [33]. We assume that
each group Gg and the PRs are respectively wiretapped by
a set of Eves such as Ke,g , {1, · · · , kg, · · · ,Kg}, ∀g and
Kp , {1, · · · , kp, · · · ,Kp}. This implies that at the same
time, each legitimate user is wiretapped by a separate group
of Eves.
We aim to design multiple beamforming vectors at the
ST, one for the JN and the other for its own information
signal, to protect both primary and secondary systems. The
transmit power at the PT is Pp > 0 and the data intended
for the PRs is xp with unit average power E{|xp|
2} = 1.
Before transmission, the data of the SRs sg in the group Gg
is weighted to the N × 1 beamforming vector wg , ∀g. Hence,
the transmitted signals at the ST can be expressed through a
vector xs as
xs =
G∑
g=1
wgsg + u (1)
where u is the artificial noise vector, whose elements are zero-
1We note that the solution for multiple antennas at the PT is straightforward
by following the same procedure presented in this paper since the resource
allocation strategies at the ST and PT are independent.
Table I
NOTATIONS AND SYMBOLS
XH , XT and tr(X) Hermitian transpose, normal transpose
and trace of a matrix X
‖ · ‖ and | · | Euclidean norm of a matrix or vector
and the magnitude of a complex scalar
IN N ×N identity matrix
x ∼ CN (η,Z) Random vector following a complex circular
Gaussian distribution with mean η
and covariance matrix Z
E[·] Statistical expectation
X  0 Positive semidefinite matrix
ℜ{·} Real part of the argument
hmg and fl Channels from ST to mg -th SR and l-th PR
gkg and fkp Channels from ST to kg-th Eve and kp-th Eve
hl and fmg Channels from PT to l-th PR and mg -th SR
gkp and fkg Channels from PT to kp-th Eve and kg-th Eve
wg Beamforming vector at ST intended to group Gg
u Artificial noise vector with u ∼ CN (0,UUH )
tg Maximum allowable rate for kg-th Eve
z Maximum allowable rate for kp-th Eve
ϕ Objective variable in maximizing secrecy rate
of secondary system
α Minimum SINR requirement for l-th PR
φg Maximum received SINR for kg-th Eve
β Maximum received SINR for kp-th Eve
mean complex Gaussian random variables with covariance
matrix UUH , such that u ∼ CN (0,UUH) with U ∈ CN×N .
The artificial noise u is assumed to be unknown to all
SRs, PRs, and Eves. For notational simplicity, we define
w , [wT1 ,w
T
2 , · · · ,w
T
G]
T ∈ CNG×1.
The corresponding SINR at the l-th PR for l = 1, · · · , L
and the kp-th Eve for kp = 1, · · · ,Kp are respectively given
by
Γp,l(w,U) =
Pp|hl|
2∑G
g=1 |f
H
l wg|
2 + ‖fHl U‖
2 + σ2l
, (2)
Γe,kp(w,U) =
Pp|gkp |
2∑G
g=1 |f
H
kp
wg|2 + ‖fHkpU‖
2 + σ2kp
(3)
where hl ∈ C, gkp ∈ C, fl ∈ C
N×1, and fkp ∈ C
N×1 are the
respective baseband equivalent channels of the links PT → l-
th PR, PT → kp-th Eve, ST → l-th PR, and ST → kp-th Eve.
σ2l and σ
2
kp
are the variance of the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the l-th PR and kp-th Eve, respectively.
The respective SINR at the mg-th SR in the group Gg and
the kg-th Eve are given by
Γs,mg(w,U) =
|hHmgwg|
2∑G
i=1,i6=g |h
H
mgwi|
2 + ‖hHmgU‖
2 + Pp|fmg |
2 + σ2mg
, (4)
Γe,kg (w,U) =
|gHkgwg|
2∑G
i=1,i6=g |g
H
kg
wi|2 + ‖gHkgU‖
2 + Pp|fkg |
2 + σ2kg
(5)
where hmg ∈ C
N×1, gkg ∈ C
N×1, fmg ∈ C, and fkg ∈ C
are the corresponding baseband equivalent channels of the
links ST → mg-th SR, ST → kg-th Eve, PT → mg-th
SR, PT → kg-th Eve. σ2mg and σ
2
kg
are the variance of
AWGN at the mg-th PR and kg-th Eve, respectively. We
further assume that all channels remain constant during a
4transmission block, yet change independently from one block
to another. By using dirty-paper coding (DPC), the ST with
encoding order from the group G1 to GG enables the SRs in
Sg to know the information signals intended for the SRs in
Sg′ , g′ = 1, · · · , g− 1 non-casually, so that it can be perfectly
eliminated [34]. Hence, the SINR in (4) by DPC can be
rewritten as
ΓDPCs,mg(w,U) =
|hHmgwg|
2∑
i>g |h
H
mgwi|
2 + ‖hHmgU‖
2 + Pp|fmg |
2 + σ2mg
.
It is clear that under the same beamformer/precoder (w,U),
ΓDPCs,mg (w,U) is better than Γs,mg (w,U). However, DPC is
difficult to implement in practice due to its extremely high
computational complexity and thus remains only as a theoret-
ical bound.
The channel of each legitimate user together with the
respective Eves form a compound wiretap channel [35]. There-
fore, the achievable secrecy rate for the l-th PR of the primary
system, denoted by Cp,l(w,U), can be expressed as [35], [36]
Cp,l(w,U) =
[
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
− max
kp∈Kp
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)]+
(6)
where [x]
+
= max {0, x}.
Similarly, the achievable secrecy rate for the mg-th SR
of the secondary system, denoted by Cs,mg (w,U), can be
expressed as [5]
Cs,mg (w,U) =
[
log2
(
1 + Γs,mg(w,U)
)
− max
kg∈Ke,g
log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)]+
. (7)
If Cp,l(w,U) and Cs,mg (w,U) are above zero, the signal
transmitted from the PT and ST are determined to be “unde-
codable” as is indicated in [6].
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
The objective of the system design is to maximize the
minimum (max-min) secrecy rate of the secondary system
while satisfying the minimum QoS requirements, such as the
secrecy rate achievable for the primary system. Accordingly,
the optimization problem can be mathematically formulated
as
P.1 : max
w,U
min
mg∈Sg,g∈G
Cs,mg (w,U) (8a)
s.t. Cp,l(w,U) ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (8b)∑G
g=1
‖wg‖
2 + ‖U‖2 ≤ Ps (8c)
where L , {1, · · · , L} and G , {1, · · · , G}. In (8b), R¯p,l > 0
are the minimum secrecy rate requirement for each legitimate
user of the primary system. This implies that the QoS for each
PR can be different and flexible. In (8c), Ps is the transmit
power budget at the ST.
Remark 1: There are two other performance metrics of
interest involved in the considered system. In particular, one is
to maximize the secrecy rate of the primary system subject to
the secrecy rate threshold of secondary system and the transmit
power budget at the ST, while the other is to minimize the total
transmit power at the ST subject to the secrecy rate threshold
of both systems. However, the optimal solution for (8) is also
applicable to those cases that will be presented shortly.
The recent works in [20], [28], [37], [38] often introduce
new variables to relax the optimization problem as
W˜g = wgw
H
g , ∀g (9)
which must satisfy the rank-one constraint, i.e., rank(W˜g) =
1, ∀g. Then, they use semi-definite program (SDP) relaxation
to solve the optimization problem by constructing an equiv-
alent problem. In which, the optimal solution involves the
dual variables of the relaxed problem. Unfortunately, some
numerical solvers may not exhibit the optimal solution of
dual variables, and then the construction of primal variables
may not be possible. In what follows, we will solve (8) via
a convex quadratic program and thus the rank-one constraints
are automatically satisfied.
III. THEORETICAL BENCHMARK WITH PERFECT CSI
We first consider the case for which the instantaneous CSI
of all channels is available at the transceivers. In particular, the
CSI of all channels in both systems can be obtained through
feedback from the legitimate receivers to the legitimate trans-
mitters. After CSI acquisition, we assume that only M SRs
and L PRs are scheduled to be concurrently served. Herein,
the remaining users (unscheduled users) are not necessarily
malicious, but they could be untrusted users. Thus, the un-
scheduled users are treated as potential eavesdroppers, but with
perfectly known CSI at the transmitters. These assumptions
are consistent with several previous works on information
theoretic analysis and optimization for the similar kind of
problem, [5], [6], [12], [20], [21], for instance.2
A. Optimal Solution
We note that finding an optimal solution for (8) is chal-
lenging due to the nonconcavity of the objective function and
nonconvexity of the feasible set. In this section, we propose
an iterative algorithm that arrives a local optimum of the
considered optimization problem. As the first step, we convert
(8) to another equivalent form as
maximize
w,U,t,z
min
mg∈Sg ,g∈G
{
log2
(
1 + Γs,mg(w,U)
)
−tg
}
(10a)
s.t. log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
≤ tg, kg ∈ Ke,g, g ∈ G (10b)
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
− z ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (10c)
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
≤ z, kp ∈ Kp (10d)
(8c) (10e)
where t , {tg} and z are the maximum allowable
rates for Eves to wiretap the information signals from
2Though this assumption is quite ideal, however, the performance with
assumption of perfect CSI is still of practical importance since it plays as
a benchmark how the CRN system may achieve in more realistic conditions
[24], [27]–[29].
5the ST and the PT, respectively. The equivalence of (8)
and (10) can be easily confirmed by justifying that the
constraint (10b) must hold with equality at optimum. We
now provide a sketch of the proof to verify this point.
Suppose that log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
< tg for some kg,
there exist the positive constants, i.e., ∆tg > 0 such that
log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
= tg −∆tg . As a result, tg −∆tg is
feasible to (10) but yielding a strictly larger objective. Thus,
this is a contradiction to the optimality assumption. Even after
the above transformations, (10) is still nonconvex and difficult
to solve due to nonconcavity of the objective function. Toward
a tractable form, let us rewrite (10) equivalently as
maximize
w,U,t,z,ϕ
ϕ (11a)
s.t. log2
(
1 + Γs,mg (w,U)
)
−tg ≥ ϕ,mg ∈ Sg, g ∈ G (11b)
log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
≤ tg, kg ∈ Ke,g, g ∈ G (11c)
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
−z ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (11d)
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
≤ z, kp ∈ Kp (11e)
(8c) (11f)
where ϕ is newly introduced variable to maximize the secrecy
rate of the secondary system. Observe that the objective
function is monotonic in its argument, therefore, we now only
deal with the nonconvex constraints (11b)-(11e). Toward this
end, we provide the following result.3
Lemma 1: For the secondary system, the inner convex
approximations of nonconvex constraints (11b) and (11c) are
given by:
F (n)mg (w,U) ≥ (ϕ+ tg) ln 2, (12)
F
(n)
kg
(w,U) ≤ tg ln 2 (13)
where F
(n)
mg (w,U) and F
(n)
kg
(w,U) are a lower bounding
concave function for log2
(
1 + Γs,mg (w,U)
)
and an upper
bounding convex function for log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
, which
are concretized by (57) and (60) in Appendix A, respectively.
Similarly for the primary system, the nonconvex constraints
(11d) and (11e) are innerly approximated by the following
convex constraints:
P
(n)
l (w,U) ≥ (z + R¯p,l) ln 2, (14)
P
(n)
kp
(w,U) ≤ z ln 2 (15)
where P
(n)
l (w,U) and P
(n)
kp
(w,U) are a lower bounding con-
cave function for log2
(
1+Γp,l(w,U)
)
and an upper bounding
convex function for log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
, which are also
concretized by (64) and (65) in Appendix A, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix A.
3Hereafter, suppose the value of (w,U) at the (n + 1)-th iteration in an
iterative algorithm presented shortly is denoted by (w(n),U(n)).
It is noteworthy that the following equalities hold at the
optimum, i.e., (w(n+1),U(n+1)) = (w(n),U(n)):
F (n)mg (w
(n),U(n)) = log2
(
1 + Γs,mg
(
w(n),U(n)
))
, (16)
F
(n)
kg
(w(n),U(n)) = log2
(
1 + Γe,kg
(
w(n),U(n)
))
, (17)
P
(n)
l (w
(n),U(n)) = log2
(
1 + Γp,l
(
w(n),U(n)
))
, (18)
P
(n)
kp
(w(n),U(n)) = log2
(
1 + Γe,kp
(
w(n),U(n)
))
. (19)
In summary, at the (n + 1)-th iteration of the proposed
method, we solve the following convex problem
maximize
w,U,t,z,ϕ
ϕ (20a)
s.t. F (n)mg (w,U) ≥ (ϕ+ tg) ln 2, mg ∈ Sg, g ∈ G (20b)
F
(n)
kg
(w,U) ≤ tg ln 2, kg ∈ Ke,g , g ∈ G (20c)
P
(n)
l (w,U) ≥ (z + R¯p,l) ln 2, l ∈ L (20d)
P
(n)
kp
(w,U) ≤ z ln 2, kp ∈ Kp (20e)
(8c). (20f)
An iterative algorithm for solving (20) requires an initial
feasible point of (11) to start, i.e., the constraints (11d)-(11f)
are satisfied. Therefore, we solve the following nonconvex
optimization problem
max
w,U,z
min
l∈L
{
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
−z − R¯p,l
}
(21a)
s.t. log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
≤ z, kp ∈ Kp (21b)
(8c). (21c)
We first generate a feasible point (w(0),U(0)) to satisfy (21c)
and then solve the following convex approximation problem
at the n-th iteration
max
w,U,z
min
l∈L
{
P
(n)
l (w,U) − (z + R¯p,l) ln 2
}
(22a)
s.t. P
(n)
kp
(w,U) ≤ z ln 2, kp ∈ Kp (22b)
(8c) (22c)
and output a feasible point of (11) when
min
l∈L
{
P
(n)
l (w,U)− (z + R¯p,l) ln 2
}
≥ 0. (23)
We numerically observe that it requires no more than 3
iterations to satisfy (23) in all cases. After solving (20), we
update (w(n),U(n)) for the next iteration until convergence or
maximum required number of iterations. Algorithm 1 outlines
the proposed iterative method for solving (8).
B. Proof of Convergence and Complexity Analysis
The convergence result of Algorithm 1 is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Algorithm 1 produces a sequence{(
w(n),U(n)
)}
of improved points of (8), which converges
to a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Complexity Analysis: We note that the proposed iterative
algorithm requires solving only simple convex quadratic and
6Algorithm 1: An iterative algorithm to solve (8)
Initialization: Set n := 0 and solve (22) to generate an
initial feasible point
(
w(n),U(n)
)
1: repeat
2: Solve (20) to obtain the optimal solution:
(
w∗,U∗
)
.
3: Update w(n+1) := w∗ and U(n+1) := U∗.
4: Set n := n+ 1.
5: until Convergence or maximum required number of
iterations
linear constraints at each iteration. We now provide the com-
plexity analysis of Algorithm 1. Specifically, in each iteration
of Algorithm 1, the per-iteration computational complexity of
solving (20) is O(n2n˜2.5+n˜3.5), where n = N(G+N)+G+2
is scalar real variables and n˜ =
∑G
g=1(Mg+Kg)+Kp+L+1
is quadratic and linear constraints [39].
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTION WITH REALISTIC SCENARIO
A. CSI Model
In this section, we extend the optimization approach of the
last section to a realistic scenario, where the instantaneous
CSI between ST and PRs is imperfectly known and Eves
are passive devices. Specifically, the primary and secondary
systems may not cooperate completely in reality, and therefore
the channels fl, ∀l will be difficult to obtain perfectly. For
instance, the PRs may be inactive for a long period of the
secondary data transmission time. Then, the CSI of the PRs
can be only obtained at the ST when the PRs is in active
mode with the PT. As a result, the CSI of PRs at the ST may
be outdated when the secondary system performs the transmit
strategy. Hence, the CSI of the link between the ST and PRs
is modeled as [11]
fl = fˆl +∆fl, ∀l
Ωl , {∆fl ∈ C
N×1 : ∆fHl ∆fl ≤ δ
2
l }
(24)
where fˆl is the channel estimate of the l-th PR available at the
ST, and ∆fl represents the associated CSI error. In particular,
we assume a time division duplex system with slowly time-
varying channels. At the beginning of each time slot, the legiti-
mate users (PRs, SRs) report their channel gains to the ST. The
downlink CSI of the ST-to-legitimate users are obtained by
measuring the uplink pilot based on some estimation methods,
such as minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE). However, the
detailed method to estimate these CSIs is beyond the scope
of this paper. For notational simplicity, we define Ωl by a
set of all possible CSI errors associated with the l-th PR. In
addition, we assume that ∆fl are deterministic and bounded,
and therefore δl represents the size of the uncertainty region
of the estimated CSI for the l-th PR.
In addition, a passive Eve does not allow legitimate users
to instantaneously obtain its CSI [11], [19], [27], which can
be justified as the following two reasons. First, to wiretap the
confidential messages from both systems, the eavesdroppers
require to become as a part of the communication system,
i.e., knowing the channel in the downlink. Second, to wiretap a
downlink channel without being removed from the system, an
eavesdropper has to protect its visibility from the ST without
exposing its CSI, for example, not responding its calls (like
a passive user). For the passive Eves, we further assume
that the entries of gkp , fkp , ∀kp, fkg , and gkg , ∀kg , follow
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading,
and that the instantaneous CSI of these wiretap channels is not
available at ST. These assumptions of passive Eves are com-
monly used in the literature [11], [17], [19], [27]. Meanwhile,
the channels hmg , ∀m, g, are assumed to be perfectly known
since the SRs are active users in the secondary system.
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
Based on the above setting and similar to (11), the opti-
mization problem P.1 can be reformulated as
P.2 : maximize
w,U,t,z,ϕ
ϕ (25a)
s.t. log2
(
1 + Γs,mg (w,U)
)
−tg ≥ ϕ,mg ∈ Sg, g ∈ G (25b)
max
gkg ,fkg
log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
≤ tg, kg ∈ Ke,g, g ∈ G(25c)
min
∆fl∈Ωl
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
−z ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (25d)
max
gkp ,fkp
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
≤ z, kp ∈ Kp (25e)
(8c) (25f)
where t , {tg} and z are the maximum allowable rates for
Eves in decoding the information signals from the ST and the
PT, respectively, which were defined in (10); ϕ is objective
variable to maximize the secrecy rate of the secondary system,
which was also defined in (11). Observe that (25b) is well
presented in (12). It is now clear that the difficulty in solving
(25) is due to (25c)-(25e) since the remaining constraints are
convex and approximate convex. Instead of this, we can find
a sub-optimal solution of (25) as follows
maximize
w,U,t,z,ϕ,φ,α,β
ϕ (26a)
s.t. log2
(
1 + φg
)
≤ tg, g ∈ G (26b)
Pr
(
max
kg∈Ke,g
Γe,kg (w,U) ≤ φg
)
≥ ǫg, g ∈ G (26c)
log2
(
1 + αl
)
−z ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (26d)
min
∆fl∈Ωl
Γp,l(w,U) ≥ αl, l ∈ L (26e)
log2
(
1 + β
)
≤ z (26f)
Pr
(
max
kp∈Kp
Γe,kp(w,U) ≤ β
)
≥ ǫ˜ (26g)
(8c), (25b) (26h)
where φ = {φg}, α = {αl}, and β are newly introduced
variables. The constraint (26e) is imposed to ensure that for
a given CSI error set Ωl, the minimum received SINR at
the l-th PR is larger than the minimum SINR requirement
αl. According to (26c) and (26g), the probabilities that the
maximum received SINR at the kg-th passive Eve and at the
kp-th passive Eve are less than φg > 0 and β > 0 are ensured
to be greater than ǫg and ǫ˜, respectively. To ensure secure
communications of the primary system (secondary system), it
is required for ǫ˜ (ǫg) to be large enough (close to 1).
7C. Proposed Solution
We are now in position to expose the hidden convexity of the
constraint of (26c), (26e), and (26g). Since U does not require
a rank-constraint matrix, we introduce U˜ , UUH to facilitate
the optimization problem. Let us handle the constraint (26e)
first by rewriting it as
max
∆fl∈Ωl
∑G
g=1
|fHl wg|
2 + tr(fHl U˜fl) + σ
2
l ≤
Pp|hl|
2
αl
, l ∈ L.
(27)
For arbitrary l-th PR, (27) can be shaped to take the following
equivalent form
G∑
g=1
µl,g + µ˜l + σ
2
l ≤
Pp|hl|2
αl
, l ∈ L (28)
max
∆fl∈Ωl
|fHl wg|
2 ≤ µl,g, l ∈ L, g ∈ G (29)
max
∆fl∈Ωl
tr(fHl U˜fl) ≤ µ˜l, l ∈ L (30)
where µl = {µl,g} and µ˜ = {µ˜l} are new variables. Note that
both sides of (28) are convex, so it is iteratively replaced by
the following linear constraint
G∑
g=1
µl,g + µ˜l + σ
2
l ≤
2Pp|hl|2
α
(n)
l
−
Pp|hl|2
(α
(n)
l )
2
αl, l ∈ L. (31)
To make the tractable form of (29) and (30), we first trans-
form these constraints into a matrix inequality based on the
following lemma.
Lemma 2: (S-Procedure [40]): Let fm(x) = x
HAmx +
2Re{bHmx}+cm, where m = {1, 2}, Am ∈ H
N ,bm ∈ CN×1
and cm ∈ R. Then there exists a xˆ such that fz(xˆ) < 0
satisfies: f1(x) ≤ 0 ⇒ f2(x) ≤ 0 if and only if there exists
ω ≥ 0 such that
ω
[
A1 b1
bH1 c1
]
−
[
A2 b2
bH2 c2
]
 0. (32)
Substituting fl = fˆl + ∆fl, ∀l into (29) and applying Lemma
2, then
∆fHl ∆fl − δ
2
l ≤ 0
⇒ (29) : ∆fHl wgw
H
g ∆fl + 2ℜ{fˆ
H
l wgw
H
g ∆fl}
+ fˆHl wgw
H
g fˆl − µl,g ≤ 0
(33)
holds if and only if there exists ωl = {ωl,g ≥ 0}, ∀l, so that
the following matrix inequality constraint holds[
ωl,gIN −wgwHg −wgw
H
g fˆl
−fˆHl wgw
H
g −fˆ
H
l wgw
H
g fˆl − ωl,gδ
2
l + µl,g
]
 0.
(34)
However, (34) is still not in a tractable form. At this point,
we apply the application of Schur’s complement lemma [41,
Eq. (7.2.6)] to obtain the following linear matrix inequality
(LMI)
∃ωl,g ≥ 0 : Cl,g(wg, µl,g, ωl,g) , 1 wHg −wHg fˆlwg ωl,gIN
−fˆHl wg −ωl,gδ
2
l + µl,g
  0, g ∈ G, l ∈ L.
(35)
It is also worth noting that constraint (35) now includes only
a finite number of constraints.
Analogously, with ω˜ = {ω˜l ≥ 0}, the constraint (30)
admits the following representation
∃ω˜l ≥ 0 : C˜l(U˜, µ˜l, ω˜l) ,[
ω˜lIN − U˜ −U˜fˆl
−fˆHl U˜ −fˆ
H
l U˜fˆl − ω˜lδ
2
l + µ˜l
]
 0, l ∈ L.
(36)
To deal with the nonconvex constraints given in (26g) and
(26c), we provide the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3: For the primary system, the constraint (26g) is
transformed to a new constraint as
λmin
(∑G
g=1
wgw
H
g + U˜
)
≥ ξ˜(β) (37)
where ξ˜(β) ,
(
exp
(
− βNPp σ
2
kp
)
/(1− ǫ˜1/Kp)1/N − 1
)
Pp
β .
Proof: See Appendix C.
In Lemma 3, the claim is clearly true in the trivial case of
β → ∞, i.e., the primary system is inactive, which leads to∑G
g=1wgw
H
g + U˜  0. This is always true and thus confirms
our analysis. Next, we rewrite (37) equivalently in the form
of
2 ln η + β
σ2kp
NPp
≥ 0 (38)(
η2/(1− ǫ˜1/Kp)1/N − 1
)
Pp ≤ βθ (39)
λmin
(∑G
g=1
wgw
H
g + U˜
)
≥ θ (40)
where θ and η are newly introduced variables. Since the
constraints (38) and (39) are convex, and we now focus on
the remaining nonconvex constraint. In (40), we note that
both
∑G
g=1wgw
H
g and U˜ are Hermitian matrices. In addition,
the eigenvalues of a Hermitian matrix Q are real and satisfy
tr(xHQHx) ≥ λ‖x‖2 for any given vector x if and only if
λmin(Q) ≥ λ. Since λmin(wgwHg ) = 0 for all g, the lower
bound of left side of (40) is given by
λmin
(∑G
g=1
wgw
H
g + U˜
)
≥ λmin(U˜). (41)
The implication of (41) is that the ST will degrade the
eavesdropper’s channel by transmitting jamming noise rather
than the desired signals. From (40), it follows that
λmin(U˜) ≥ θ ⇔ U˜  INθ. (42)
Lemma 4: For the secondary system, the constraint (26c)
is transformed to a new constraint as
‖wg‖
2
φg
≤ ξg +
G∑
i=1,i6=g
‖wi‖
2 + λmin(U˜), g ∈ G (43)
where ξg ,
[
exp
(
σ2kg
NPp
)
ǫ
−1/NKg
g − 1
]
Pp.
Proof: See Appendix D.
8The formulation in (43) can be further shaped to take the
following convex constraints
‖wg‖
2
φg
≤ ξg +
G∑
i=1,i6=g
2ℜ{(w
(n)
i )
Hwi}
−
G∑
i=1,i6=g
‖w
(n)
i ‖
2 + ϑ, g ∈ G (44)
λmin(U˜) ≥ ϑ⇔ U˜  INϑ (45)
where ϑ is newly introduced variable.
Remark 2: We note that the new constraints in (37) and
(43) are not equivalent to (26g) and (26c). Specifically, the
optimal solutions for the former are also feasible for the latter,
respectively, but not vice versa due to the inequalities in (76)
and (81), and thus this leads to a lower bound of the system
performance.
Remark 3: In this paper, the wiretap channels are modeled
as i.i.d. Rayleigh random variables. Nevertheless, a different
continuous channel distribution does not affect the type of
constraints in (37) and (43). In other words, the proposed
convex approximation is still applicable to any continuous
channel distribution thanks to widespread applications of inner
approximation method [42]. Therefore, our study is valid
without loss of generality.
With the above discussions, the approximate convex prob-
lem solved at the (n+ 1)-th iteration of the proposed design
is given by
maximize
w,U˜0,t,z,ϕ,φ,α,
β,µl,µ˜,ωl,ω˜,θ,η,ϑ
ϕ (46a)
s.t. F (n)mg (w, U˜) ≥ (ϕ+ tg) ln 2, mg ∈ Sg, g ∈ G (46b)∑G
g=1
‖wg‖
2 + tr(U˜) ≤ Ps (46c)
(26b), (26d), (26f), (31), (35),
(36), (38), (39), (42), (44), (45). (46d)
To find an initial feasible point to (25), we solve the following
convex optimization problem
max
w,U˜0,z,α,β,
µl,µ˜,ωl,ω˜,θ,η
min
l∈L
{
log2
(
1 + αl
)
−z − R¯p,l
}
(47a)
s.t. (26f), (31), (35), (36), (38), (39), (42), (46c) (47b)
and stop at reaching
min
l∈L
{
log2
(
1 + αl
)
−z − R¯p,l
}
≥ 0. (48)
The proposed iterative method is outlined in Algorithm 2. In a
similar manner to Proposition 1, we can show that Algorithm
2 yields a nondecreasing sequence of objective due to updating
the involved variables after each iteration.
Complexity Analysis: The optimization problem in (46)
involves GL LMI constraints of size N+2, L LMI constraints
of size N+1, and 2 LMI constraints of size N . Since the major
complexity of solving (46) comes from LMI constraints, we
ignore the complexity of the constraints of lower sizes and they
will not affect the complexity order of the whole problem.
Algorithm 2: An iterative algorithm to solve (25)
Initialization: Set n := 0 and solve (47) to generate an
initial feasible point
(
w(n), U˜(n),α(n)
)
1: repeat
2: Solve (46) to obtain the optimal solution:(
w∗, U˜∗,α∗).
3: Update w(n+1) := w∗, U˜(n+1) := U˜∗, and
α(n+1) := α∗.
4: Set n := n+ 1.
5: until Convergence or maximum required number of
iterations
As a result, in each iteration of Algorithm 2, the worst-
case computational complexity for solving the generic convex
problem in (46) using interior point methods is given by
O
(
n
√
GL(N + 2) + L(N + 1) + 2N
[
GL(N+2)3+L(N+
1)3 + 2N3 + nGL(N + 2)2 + nL(N + 1)2 + 2nN2 + n2
])
,
where n = G(L + 3) +N(N +G) + 2L+ 6 [39].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we use simulations to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed approach. The number of groups
of SUs is set to G = 2, each of which consists of two
SR users, i.e., Mg = 2, ∀g. The number of PRs is set to
L = 2, and each group of SUs and PUs is surrounded
by two Eves, i.e., Kp = Kg = 2. All channel entries are
assumed to be i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with
CN (0, 1), and the background thermal noise at each user is
generated as i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with
zero means and unit variance. The transmit power at the PT
is fixed to Pp = 20 dBm. For simplicity, we further assume
that the minimum secrecy rate requirement for all PUs are
the same, i.e., R¯p,l = R¯p, ∀l. For the imperfect CSI of the
PU channels, we define the normalized channel estimation
errors as δ¯2l = δ
2
l /‖fl‖
2 = 5%, ∀l. To guarantee secure
communications, we choose ǫ˜ = 0.99 and ǫg = 0.99, ∀g for
the passive Eves. The results obtained in this paper are referred
to as the proposed optimal scheme. We also compare the
performance of the proposed scheme with the known solutions,
namely, the “No JN scheme” [23], [24] and “Partial ZF (zero-
forcing) scheme” [22]. In the “No JN scheme,” the optimal
solution can be obtained by setting U to 0. In the “Partial ZF
scheme,” we consider the null space approach at the ST. First
of all, the JN is transmitted to all Eves and to avoid interfering
with both PUs and SUs as
UH fl = 0, ∀l and U
Hhmg = 0, ∀mg, g. (49)
In a CRN, the primary system should have higher priority, and
thus the transmitted information at the ST should not generate
interferences to the PUs as
wHg fl = 0, ∀l, g. (50)
To simplify the problem, we enforce the information transmit-
ted at the ST so that it should not introduce interference to
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(a) Convergence results of Algorithm 1 for different numbers of antennas
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Figure 2. Convergence results of Algorithm 1 and 2 for different numbers of
antennas at the ST over one random channel realization with R¯p = 2 bps/Hz
and Ps = 15 dBm.
other groups as
wHg hmi = 0, ∀i 6= g. (51)
It is evident that Γp,l =
Pp|hl|
2
σ2
l
, ∀l, does not depend on wg
and U. So, we utilize (49), (50), and (51) into P1 to obtain
the optimal solution for “Partial ZF scheme.” To solve convex
problems we use the SDPT3 as the internal solver [43] in
MATLAB environment. The results of the secrecy rate are
shown by averaging over 1,000 simulation trials.
Fig. 2 illustrates the typical convergence behavior of the
proposed Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 as a function of the
number of iterations with different numbers of antennas at
the ST for Algorithm 1 in Fig. 2(a) and for Algorithm 2 in
Fig. 2(b). As seen, the objective values of both algorithms
increase rapidly within the first 10 iterations and stabilize
after a few more iterations, and its convergence rate is slightly
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Transmit power at the ST, Ps [dBm]
Av
er
ag
e
se
cr
ec
y
ra
te
o
fS
U
(bp
s/H
z) Proposed optimal schemePartial ZF scheme
No JN scheme
Figure 3. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system vs. the transmit
power at the ST with perfect CSI, where R¯p = 2 bps/Hz and N = 8.
sensitive to the problem size i.e., as N increases. The conver-
gence results also confirm that all optimization variables are
accounted to find a better solution for the next iteration, i.e.,
the secrecy rates of SUs monotonically increasing. In addition,
Fig. 2 shows that at least 90% of secrecy rate is obtained when
the proposed algorithms reach to 10 iterations.
Fig. 3 plots the average secrecy rate of secondary system
versus the transmit power at the ST. As can be seen, the
proposed optimal scheme greatly improves the secrecy rate
of the “Partial ZF scheme” and “No JN scheme,” especially
in high power regime. The performance gain is thus achieved
as a result of more intelligent interference management than
that of other schemes for primary users and Eves. Another
interesting observation is that the “No JN scheme” outperforms
the “Partial ZF scheme” in low power regime (Ps ≤ 12 dBm),
but it tends to saturate when the transmit power becomes high.
This is mainly due to the fact that, in high power regime, the
ST needs to scale down the transmit power to maintain the
secrecy rate of the primary system, which results in a loss of
the secrecy rate of secondary system. Moreover, the simulation
results in Fig. 3 further confirm that incorporating information
and JN beamforming is a powerful means to transmit with full
power.
In Fig. 4, we study the secrecy rate of secondary system
as a function of the number of transmit antennas at the ST,
N . The results show that the achievable secrecy rate increases
as the number of transmit antennas increases in all schemes,
since more degrees of freedom are added to the ST. The
proposed optimal scheme still achieves a better performance
than other schemes in all the range of N . We note that the
optimal solution for the “Partial ZF scheme” is infeasible when
N < 7 because for the “Partial ZF scheme,” interference
among legitimate users cannot be completely canceled out
with insufficient number of transmit antennas. As expected,
the gap between the proposed scheme and “Partial ZF scheme”
is reduced as a result of providing more degrees of freedom.
The average secrecy rate of the secondary system is inves-
tigated as a function of the minimum secrecy rate requirement
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Figure 4. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system vs. the number of
transmit antennas at the ST with perfect CSI, where R¯p = 2 bps/Hz and Ps
= 10 dBm.
of primary system, R¯p, in Fig. 5(a) for different schemes and
in Fig. 5(b) for different power sharing. As can be seen from
Fig. 5(a), the secondary system achieves a higher secrecy rate
with the proposed optimal scheme than with other schemes.
Notably, the performance of “No JN scheme” is degraded
significant as R¯p increases. The main reason for such a case
is that, the ST is required to cause less interference to the PRs
and transmit high interference to degrade the Eves’ channels,
which results in a significant loss of the secondary system’s
secrecy rate. The secrecy rate of the “Partial ZF scheme”
is nearly unchanged when R¯p increases and approaches that
of the proposed optimal scheme for high R¯p, since the ST
does not cause any interference to the PRs. In Fig. 5(b), we
plot the average secrecy rate of the secondary system for
the proposed optimal scheme under different assumption of
sharing equally the resources, i.e., transmit power at the ST.
Particularly, the information and JN beamforming are assumed
to share 50% of the power resource, i.e.,
∑G
g=1 ‖wg‖
2 ≤ Ps/2
and ‖U‖2 ≤ Ps/2. As seen, the proposed joint information
and JN beamforming offers better performance compared to
that of the equal transmit power scheme. However, the gap
between the schemes diminishes for high secrecy rate of the
primary system. The reason for this is two-fold: 1) For small
R¯p, a small portion of JN already fulfills the QoS requirement
of PU, and there is no need to further waste power budget
on JN; 2) For extremely stringent QoS requirement of PU, JN
becomes crucial and so it is reasonable to allocate a significant
part of the power budget to JN (i.e., nearly a half as shown in
Fig. 5(b)) to meet the QoS requirement. From both Figs. 5(a)
and 5(b), for high R¯p, the secondary system lacks degree of
freedom for leveraging multiuser diversity.
We now turn our attention to illustrate the robustness of
the proposed design in realistic scenario. We also compare
the performance of the proposed robust design to that of non-
robust secrecy rate. For the non-robust secrecy rate design,
we use the presumed CSIs as fˆl, ∀l rather than the true
ones, to perform the transmit design (as presented in Section
IV), which then evaluates the resultant secrecy rate. Fig. 6
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(a) Average secrecy rate of the secondary system for different schemes,
where Ps = 10 dBm.
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Figure 5. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system vs. the minimum
secrecy rate requirement of the primary system, (a) for different schemes and
(b) for different power sharing with perfect CSI, where N = 8.
depicts the secrecy rate as a function of the transmit power
at the ST. As can be observed that the secrecy rate of non-
robust design is sensitive to the CSI uncertainties for high
Ps. In particular, when Ps ≥ 8 dBm, the non-robust design
exhibits the degradation in terms of the secrecy rate that tends
to worsen as Ps increases. Moreover, the proposed optimal
design achieves the best secrecy rate performance, compared
to other designs.
Finally, we generate cumulative distribution functions
(CDFs) of the secrecy rate of the secondary system in Fig. 7(a)
for different schemes and in Fig. 7(b) for different power
sharing. It is obvious in both CDFs that on account for a larger
feasible set, the proposed optimal scheme can promise a bigger
secrecy rate as expected. For instance, the proposed optimal
scheme attains 0.8 bps/Hz and 2.8 bps/Hz of the achievable
secrecy rate higher than the non-robust scheme and “No JN
scheme,” respectively, for approximately 60% of the simulated
trials in Fig. 7(a). For large R¯p, the gap between the proposed
design and non-robust design is reduced as in Fig. 7(b) due
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power at the ST with realistic scenario, where R¯p = 1 bps/Hz and N = 8.
to a decrease in the available multiuser diversity gain.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered PHY security for both
primary and secondary systems in the presence of multiple
secondary receiver groups and multiple primary receivers. The
secondary system has been proposed to assist the primary
system by sending jamming noise to degrade the decoding
capability of the eavesdroppers. The main objective is to
maximize the secrecy rate of the secondary system, while the
secondary transmitter is constrained not only by the power
budget, but also by the individual minimum secrecy rate
requirements of the primary users. We have proposed iterative
algorithms to solve the optimization problems. The idea of the
proposed method is to approximate the nonconvex problem
by a convex formulation in each iteration. We have proved
that our iterative algorithms are guaranteed to monotonically
converge to at least local optima of the original nonconvex
design problems. We have carried out simulations to evaluate
the advantages of the proposed design. It has been shown
that for a given initial feasible point, the proposed iterative
algorithms are guaranteed to always converge to an optimal
solution.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The following inequalities play an important role in our
developments:
ln
(
1 +
|x|2
y
)
≥ ln
(
1 +
|x(n)|2
y(n)
)
−
|x(n)|2
y(n)
+ 2
ℜ{(x(n))∗x}
y(n)
−
|x(n)|2(|x|2 + y)
y(n)(y(n) + |x(n)|2)
, ∀x ∈ C, y > 0, (52)
|x|2
y
≥ 2
(x(n))∗x
y(n)
−
|x(n)|2
(y(n))2
y, ∀x ∈ C, y > 0, (53)
ln(1 + x) ≤ ln
(
1 + x(n)
)
+
(x− x(n))
(1 + x(n))
, ∀x ≥ 0 (54)
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(a) CDF of the secrecy rate of the secondary system for different schemes,
where R¯p = 1 bps/Hz.
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Figure 7. CDF of secrecy rate of the secondary system, the probability that
the secrecy rate will take a value less than or equal to a given secrecy rate
threshold, (a) for different schemes and (b) for different power sharing with
realistic scenario, where N = 8 and Ps = 20 dBm.
where (52) and (53) follow from the convexity of functions
ln
(
1 + |x|2/y
)
and |x|2/y [44], [45], respectively; while (54)
is a result of the concavity of function ln(1 + x).
Let us treat the nonconvex constraint (11b) first. As the first
step, (4) is equivalently rewritten by
Γs,mg(w,U) =
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U)
(55)
where
χs,mg (w,U) =
G∑
i=1,i6=g
|hHmgwi|
2 + ‖hHmgU‖
2
+ Pp|fmg |
2 + σ2mg .
From (55), it follows that
ln
(
1+
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U)
)
= − ln
(
1−
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U) + |h
H
mgwg|
2
)
.
(56)
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From the fact that 0 ≤
|hHmgwg |
2
χs,mg (w,U)+|h
H
mg
wg |2
, Θ(w,U) <
1, the function − ln
(
1 − Θ(w,U)
)
is jointly convex w.r.t.
the involved variables [40], which is useful for developing an
approximate solution for (56). In particular, at feasible point(
w(n),U(n)
)
, applying (52) yields
− ln
(
1−
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U) + |h
H
mgwg|
2
)
≥ − ln
(
1−
|hHmgw
(n)
g |2
χs,mg (w
(n),U(n)) + |hHmgw
(n)
g |2
)
− Γs,mg
(
w(n),U(n)
)
+ 2
ℜ
{
(w
(n)
g )Hhmgh
H
mgwg
}
χs,mg(w
(n),U(n))
−
Γs,mg
(
w(n),U(n)
)(
χs,mg (w,U) + |h
H
mgwg|
2
)
χs,mg (w
(n),U(n)) + |hHmgw
(n)
g |2
:= F (n)mg (w,U). (57)
Note that F
(n)
mg (w,U) is concave and is global lower bound
of − ln
(
1 − Θ(w,U)
)
. It implies that we can iteratively
replace− ln
(
1−Θ(w,U)
)
by F
(n)
mg (w,U) to achieve a convex
approximation of (11b) [42]. Hence, by substituting (55),
(56), and (57) into (11b), we provide (12). To handling the
constraint (11c), we equivalently rewrite Γe,kg (w,U) as
Γe,kg (w,U) =
|gHkgwg|
2
χe,kg (w,U)
(58)
where
χe,kg (w,U) =
G∑
i=1,i6=g
|gHkgwi|
2+‖gHkgU‖
2+Pp|fkg |
2+σ2kg .
The constraint (11c) requires a tight upper bound of log2
(
1+
Γe,kg (w,U)
)
. Applying (54) yields
ln
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
≤ log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w
(n),U(n))
)
+
(
1 + Γe,kg (w
(n),U(n))
)−1
×
( |gHkgwg|2
χe,kg (w,U)
− Γe,kg (w
(n),U(n))
)
. (59)
Although the right-hand side of (59) is still nonconvex, it can
be further convexified by
F
(n)
kg
(w,U) := log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w
(n),U(n))
)
+
(
1 + Γe,kg (w
(n),U(n))
)−1
×
( |gHkgwg|2
Φ
(n)
kg
(w,U)
− Γe,kg (w
(n),U(n))
)
(60)
where Φ
(n)
kg
(w,U) is the first-order approximation of
χe,kg (w,U) around the point (w
(n),U(n)) by using (53),
which is given by
Φ
(n)
kg
(w,U) ,
G∑
i=1,i6=g
2ℜ
{
(w
(n)
i )
Hgkgg
H
kgwi
}
−
G∑
i=1,i6=g
|gHkgw
(n)
i |
2 + 2ℜ
{
gHkgU
(n)UHgkg
}
− ‖gHkgU
(n)‖2 + Pp|fkg |
2 + σ2kg .
The constraint (11c) is then approximated by the following
convex constraint
F
(n)
kg
(w,U) ≤ tg ln 2. (61)
In a similar manner, at feasible point
(
w(n),U(n)
)
, the
nonconvex constraints (11d) and (11e) are approximated by
the following convex constraints
P
(n)
l (w,U) ≥ (z + R¯p,l) ln 2, (62)
P
(n)
kp
(w,U) ≤ z ln 2 (63)
where P
(n)
l (w,U) and P
(n)
kp
(w,U) are respectively given by
P
(n)
l (w,U) := ln
(
1 + Γp,l(w
(n),U(n))
)
+ Γp,l
(
w(n),U(n)
)
− Γp,l(w
(n),U(n))
(
χp,l(w,U) + Pp|hl|2
)
χp,l(w(n),U(n)) + Pp|hl|2
, (64)
P
(n)
kp
(w,U) := ln
(
1 + Γe,kp(w
(n),U(n))
)
+
(
1 + Γe,kp(w
(n),U(n))
)−1
×
( Pp|gkp |2
Φ
(n)
kp
(w,U)
− Γe,kp(w
(n),U(n))
)
, (65)
with
Φ
(n)
kp
(w,U) =
G∑
g=1
2ℜ{(w(n)g )
Hfkp f
H
kpwg} −
G∑
g=1
|fHkpw
(n)
g |
2
+ 2ℜ{fHkpU
(n)UHfkp} − ‖f
H
kpU
(n)‖2 + σ2kp ,
χp,l(w,U) =
∑G
g=1
|fHl wg|
2 + ‖fHl U‖
2 + σ2l ,
χe,kp(w,U) =
∑G
g=1
|fHkpwg|
2 + ‖fHkpU‖
2 + σ2kp .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let ϕ(w,U) and ϕ(n)(w,U) denote the objective of (11)
and (20), respectively. We have
ϕ(w,U) ≥ ϕ(n)(w,U), (thanks to (57)) (66)
and
ϕ(w(n),U(n)) = ϕ(n)(w(n),U(n)), (thanks to (16)). (67)
Let
(
w(n+1),U(n+1)
)
and
(
w(n),U(n)
)
be the optimal solu-
tion and feasible point of (20), respectively. It follows that
ϕ
(
w(n+1),U(n+1)
)
≥ ϕ(n)
(
w(n+1),U(n+1)
)
≥ ϕ(n)
(
w(n),U(n)
)
= ϕ
(
w(n),U(n)
)
. (68)
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It shows that
(
w(n+1),U(n+1)
)
is a better point to (20) than(
w(n),U(n)
)
in the scene of improving the objective value.
Furthermore, the sequence {ϕ(n)} is bounded above due to
the power constraint in (8c). Let
(
w¯, U¯
)
be a saddle point of
(20), by Cauchy’s theorem, there is a convergent subsequence{(
w(nκ),U(nκ)
)}
satisfying
lim
κ→+∞
[
ϕ
(
w(nκ),U(nκ)
)
− ϕ
(
w¯, U¯
)]
= 0. (69)
For every n there is κ such that nκ ≤ n ≤ nκ+1. From (68)
and (69), it is true that
0 = lim
κ→+∞
[
ϕ
(
w(nκ),U(nκ)
)
− ϕ
(
w¯, U¯
)]
≤ lim
n→+∞
[
ϕ
(
w(n),U(n)
)
− ϕ
(
w¯, U¯
)]
≤ lim
κ→+∞
[
ϕ
(
w(nκ+1),U(nκ+1)
)
− ϕ
(
w¯, U¯
)]
= 0 (70)
which leads to lim
n→+∞
ϕ
(
w(n),U(n)
)
= ϕ
(
w¯, U¯
)
. In other
words, Algorithm 1 will stop when the following termination
condition is met, i.e.,∣∣∣(ϕ(w(n),U(n))− ϕ(w¯, U¯)) /ϕ(w¯, U¯)∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ (71)
where ǫ is a given accuracy. Following the same arguments as
those in [42, Theorem 1], we can prove that each accumulation
point
(
w¯, U¯
)
of the sequence
{(
w(n),U(n)
)}
is a KKT-point
of (8). Proposition 1 is thus proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Since the channels are modeled as i.i.d. Rayleigh random
variables, the constraint in (26g) can be rewritten for each kp
link as
Pr
( Pp|gkp |2∑G
g=1 tr(FkpW˜g) + tr(FkpU˜) + σ
2
kp
≤ β
)
≥ ǫ˜ (72)
⇔ Pr
(Pp
β
|gkp |
2 ≤ tr
(
Fkp
( G∑
g=1
W˜g + U˜
))
+ σ2kp
)
≥ ǫ˜ (73)
where Fkp , fkpf
H
kp
and W˜g , wgw
H
g . It is very difficult to
calculate the distribution of tr
(
Fkp
(∑G
g=1 W˜g+U˜
))
directly.
Instead of this, we consider its lower bound. For notational
simplicity, let us define A =
∑G
g=1 W˜g + U˜. In [46],
N∑
i=1
λi(Fkp)λN−i+1(A) ≤ tr(FkpA) (74)
is shown for N × N Hermitian matrices Fkp and A, where
λi(X) denotes the i-th eigenvalue of matrix X ∈ HN×N , and
its magnitude is sorted as λmax(X) = λ1(X) ≥ λ2(X) ≥
· · · ≥ λN (X) = λmin(X). Since Fkp is a rank-one positive
semidefinite matrix, (74) can be written as
tr(FkpA) ≥ λ1(Fkp)λN (A)
= λmax(Fkp)λmin(A)
= tr(Fkp)λmin(A). (75)
Substituting (75) into (73), we get
Pr
(Pp
β
|gkp |
2 ≤ tr
(
Fkp
( G∑
g=1
W˜g + U˜
))
+ σ2kp
)
≥ Pr
(Pp
β
|gkp |
2 ≤ tr(Fkp)λmin(A) + σ
2
kp
)
≥ ǫ˜. (76)
Let x = tr(Fkp) = tr(|fkg |
2). Then, x follows a chi-squared
distribution since |fkg |
2 is a sum of squares of N independent
Gaussian random variables. Correspondingly, the probability
density function (PDF) of x is given as fX(x) =
e−xxN−1
Γ(N) . Let
y =
Pp
β |gkp |
2, and it then follows an exponential distribution
with the PDF as fY (y) =
β
Pp
e
− β
Pp
y
. Therefore, the probability
in (76) is obtained as
Pr
(
y ≤ xλmin(A) + σ
2
kp
)
≥ ǫ˜
⇔
∫ ∞
0
∫ xλmin(A)+σ2kp
0
fX(x)fY (y)dydx ≥ ǫ˜
⇔
∫ ∞
0
(
1− exp
(
−
β
Pp
(xλmin(A) + σ
2
kp)
))
fX(x)dx ≥ ǫ˜
(a)
⇔ 1− exp
(
−
β
Pp
σ2kp
)[ β
Pp
λmin(A) + 1
]−N
≥ ǫ˜ (77)
where (a) is obtained using [47, Eq. (3.351.3)]. Next, the
constraint in (26g) for Kp links is given as
(26g)⇔
Kp∏
kp=1
Pr
( Pp|gkp |2∑G
g=1 tr(FkpW˜g) + tr(FkpU˜) + σ
2
kp
≤ β
)
≥ ǫ˜
(b)
⇔ 1− exp
(
−
β
Pp
σ2kp
)[ β
Pp
λmin(A) + 1
]−N
≥ ǫ˜1/Kp
⇔ λmin(A) ≥
[
exp
(
−
β
NPp
σ2kp
)
/(1− ǫ˜1/Kp)1/N − 1
]Pp
β
(78)
where (b) is obtained by combining (77) since the channels of
Kp passive Eves are independent and modeled as i.i.d. random
variables.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The constraint in (26c) can be rewritten for each kg link as
Pr
(
Ppφg|fkg |
2 ≥
tr
(
Gkg
(
W˜g − φg
G∑
i=1,i6=g
W˜i − φgU˜
))
−σ2kgφg
)
≥ ǫg (79)
where Gkg , gkgg
H
kg
for all kg . For any given N × N
Hermitian matrix B, it follows from [46] that
tr(GkgB) ≤
N∑
i=1
λi(Gkg )λi(B)
= λmax(Gkg )λmax(B)
= tr(Gkg )λmax(B). (80)
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Substituting (75) and (80) into (79), we have
Pr
(
Ppφg|fkg |
2 ≥ tr
(
Gkg
(
W˜g − φg
G∑
i=1,i6=g
W˜i
− φgU˜
))
−σ2kgφg
)
≥ Pr
(
Ppφg|fkg |
2 ≥ tr(Gkg )
[
‖wg‖
2 − φg
G∑
i=1,i6=g
‖wi‖
2
− φgλmin(U˜)
]
− σ2kgφg
)
≥ ǫg. (81)
Following similar steps to the proof of Lemma 3, we can
obtain
‖wg‖2
φg
−
G∑
i=1,i6=g
‖wi‖
2 − λmin(U˜)
≤
[
exp
( σ2kg
NPp
)
ǫ−1/NKgg − 1
]
Pp
⇔
‖wg‖
2
φg
≤
[
exp
( σ2kg
NPp
)
ǫ−1/NKgg − 1
]
Pp
+
G∑
i=1,i6=g
‖wi‖
2 + λmin(U˜) (82)
which completes the proof.
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